A collection of readings on the relationship between politics and economics in developing countries, with a special emphasis on Latin America.The book contains 35 essays that show students how modern political-economic tools can explain market failures and government policy in areas such as international trade and capital flows, economic growth and business cycles, income inequality, gender relations and the environment.This paper examines a less studied mode of influence: private regulation, defined as voluntary efforts by firms to restrain their own behavior.
His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers.
He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible.
How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy?
Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries.
The book is available from Many theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies.
Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption.Our findings shed new light on the politics of war in democracies, and may provide behavioral foundations for peace among human-rights-respecting states. Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have economically self-interested preferences about trade policy.Click here for the online appendix, and here for replication files. We investigate one potential explanation for this puzzling finding: economic ignorance.Second, human rights affect support for war primarily by changing perceptions about threat and morality.Citizens are more likely to view human rights violators as threatening, and have fewer moral qualms about fighting such countries. The dominant approach to the study of international political economy assumes that the policy preferences of individuals and groups reflect economic self-interest.Our study documents an understudied source of corporate power, while also exposing the limits of private regulation as a strategy for influencing government policy.